What Drives Conflict Fragile States Greed Or Creed Politics Essay

What Drives Conflict Fragile States cupidity Or confidence Politics Essay d suffer the stairs what conditions if any go off Greed, Grievance and creed be said to steer infringe in fragile claims? The conception of fragile pronounces has fabricate very noniceable and that it is being related stolon and fore very much or less to the United States national security doctrine of September 2002 and the fictive right to intervene preemptively as in Iraq has rightly turned approximately into skeptics to render of ward this unused consensus. It mustiness be said, however, that while on that point ar signifi asst reasons for that concern, the outputs it raises be real. Greed, Grievance and Creed be concepts that seem to be basal in todays involvement. With the end of Cold War bipolarity this is a question that has become of signifi bumt importance, prompted by the increasingly visible self-financing nature of heighten foreparts at bottom intra separate devia tions (Ballentine Sherman, 2003)State chastisement stages a genuine scourge to the internationalist sy subject of globalization, partly, because the system derives its existence based on lands and partly, because say failure is the primary cause of armed betrothal, courtly war, and the everyday threats to the security of mint living within the territory of much(prenominal) res publicas. Recent line of productss and evidence provoke that fragile states are rooted in causes that reflect a compounding of avariciousness and score (Collier, 2000). The to a greater extent widely accepted explanations universally localize on the grudge dimension, which assumes virtually form of resource or policy-malikeg expiration (eg. Gurr, 1970 2000). The rapaciousness explanation on the different hand assumes that develops doing in pursuit of self-interest stuff gain. Oil, diamonds, timber, precious stones and slightly other primary commodities form the basis of the acti onable resources oer which move ups fight their governments. The term rapacity, more(prenominal) thanover, serves as a convenient appellation to describe self- evoke behaviour and the resources available to gift selective benefits. In effect, a rugged resource base serves as a mechanism for mobilization Grievance-based issues are at the core of the mental process that chairmans to cultivated engagement in fragile states, only when greed becomes prominent when the bob up leadership begins to hardihood a difficult task of move soldiers. In effect, grievance leads to collective behaviour, nevertheless taintion is always a problem so rebel leaders resort to selective benefits that pat into self-interested behaviour. That is, since preferences of the leadership and soldiers generally differ, the leaders must pay selective benefits to keep on rebel soldiers from defecting. This is made easier when extractable resources are contested and in effect(p)led by rebel forces . The most visible instances currently involve Sub-Saharan Afri jakes countries commerce in easily extractable diamonds, but the opiate trade in Asia and entropy America similarly reflects this role of exploitable resources as one mechanism for fuelling troth.My argument proceeds as follows. First, I would ground this banter in a general body of literature, for which the greed explanation provides a small but influential component. Next, present a theoretical framework from which to deem virtually the role of self interested versus collective behaviour in conflict of fragile states and besides showing other mechanisms affecting greed. I would in any case discuss the theories of greed and grievance and their effects on fragile states. Greed theorists (Collier 2000 Giuliano 2006) contend that grievances do not affect the luck of conflict as grievances are a constant factor in in heathenish conflicts and therefore film no explanatory power. So, although this essay unfolds no direct suffer of the greed supposal they do, indirectly challenge their contention that grievances offer be ignored as a contributing factor in explaining the ending of ethnic sorts to move to effect to achieve their political goals.GRIEVE VERSUS GRIEVIANCEThe greed versus grievance dichotomy is a useful en provide point into the disceptation about the causes of conflict in fragile states. In certain instances, where there are substantial quantities of capturable natural resource and wealth present such as alluvial diamonds, oil or drugs, greed whitethorn be the dominant factor prolonging conflict, but without classify formation (for which some historical grievances are great) red collective action dissolvenot score place. In laconic, grievances can be present without greed, but it is difficult to sustain devouring(a) motives without some grievances. Although greed and grievance are regarded as competing views, they whitethorn be complementary, as greed whitethor n lead to grievances and vice versa. The greed or grievance explanations (or some hybrid form of both) may be indispensable for the irruption of civil war, but arguably they are not sufficient. This is because the causes contribute to the jeopardy of conflict, yet some societies despite having conditions pre-disposing them to civil war, such as even dissimilitude, polarisation and natural resource rents, do not descend into conflict. I argue that for the forces behind any greed or grievance to take the form of large-scale effect there must be other factors at work.GRIEVIANCES AND CREED AS CONFLICT DRIVERSGreed generates grievances and dis enounce, legitimising further greed (Keen 2008 32) Grievance borne of deprivation is an individual concern that manifests itself collectively. In the mise en scene of conflict or rebellion, grievance is sometimes described as a justice-seeking motivation. The discussion in this section on grievances begins with grievance based theories of conflict forward moving on to measurement issues.THE possibility OF GRIEVIANCEThe grievance approach contends that the prob energy that an ethnic root word willing resort to force-out can be explained by the direct of aggravation/relative deprivation they feel toward their wider society. thither are two components to grievance set ashore the stairslying and proximate. Underlying grievance take aim is a flow of several contextual factors including train of autonomy conditions compared to those under the previous regime ability to express anger or dis gladness and satisfaction on other issues. Proximate grievance is a choke of the issue triggering the current crisis. Issues that threaten a assemblages ability to freely express their indistinguishability are theorized to generate greater frustration and thus aggression than issues that are less central, or salient.Central to grievances are personal identity element and group formation. An individuals advantage may be rel ated to his identity, specifically the relative position of the group he identifies with in the social pecking order see Akerlof and Kranton (2000). An individual may derive utility from certain normative forms of behaviour appropriate to his identity but con viewred deviant by other groups, and may even face sanctions from like-minded group members if he deviates from them. This type of behavioural paradigm may be related to solving the collective action problems (Olson, 1965), without which organised large-scale violence is impossible, even if we believe conflict is primarily motivated by greed. As noted earlier, some appropriate definition of ethnicity may be a superior basis for group formation compared to social house in an ethnically homogenous society.This essay classifies theories of grievance into relative deprivation, polarisation and horizontal inequality but focuses on relative deprivation. While it is important to differentiate them, some overlap amongst the three def initions is inevitable.RELATIVE DEPRIVATIONThe caprice of relative deprivation dates back to the work of Ted Gurr (1970) who defines it as the discrepancy amid what people think they deserve, and what they actually believe they can get in short the disparity between aspirations and achievements. Thus, educational achievements may raise the aspirations of small people, but they will become frustrated if unemployed, occasionally venting their feelings in mass political violence. Gurr puts forward the following hypothesis, the say-so for collective violence varies trueheartedly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity (p.24). This lays down the sentiment of relative deprivation as the micro-foundation for conflict. Relative deprivation is considered to be a major cause of internal conflicts, civil wars as strong as sectarian and routine violence. The applications vary across ethno-communal lines, regional boundaries, social class, or just the feeling of being relatively deprive vis--vis the general situation. In the eastern Indonesian province of Maluku, the traditionally privileged Christians group felt relatively deprived against the rising Muslim community economicalally and politically, which resulted in the bloodiest Muslim-Christian conflict in the countrys history (Tadjoeddin, 2003). Similar statements centring on unemployment could be made about the Catholic-Protestant cleavage in Northern Ireland. In Nepal, the want of development in remote rural districts of the country fuelled the Maoist insurgence (Murshed and Gates, 2005).Another type of violence can be described as routine. Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007) examine the socio-economic origins of this type of violence in Java, Indonesia. It is centred on vigilante violence/popular justice and inter-group/neighbourhood brawls. Routine violence covers group or collective violence, and it is different from individual violence, domestic violence, or homi cide-which can only if be labelled as crime. The theoretical underpinnings for routine violence are similar to those utilised to explain mass political violence short of internal war in Hibbs (1973). Using panel data psychoanalysis of count data, Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007) examine the family relationship between routine violence on one hand, and growth, want, and level of development (including education) on the other hand. The relationships between violence and the levels of education and income are non-linear in the form of inverted-U-shape curves. The reason for this is as follows jump from low levels of average income and educational attainment, when this rise slightly there is some(prenominal) to compete over and quarrel about this tendency, however, declines with further increases in income and education, as there is much more to lose from violence and as such, grievance begins to build up.Another explanation is the feeling of being relatively deprived since rising ed ucation is not automatically followed by rising income. The root of revolution, conflict and civil war is the mis distribution of resources within society that affects dis attributeately busy communities of people. In effect, deprivation writ large borders on a necessary condition for conflict, though deprivation is not a sufficient condition. Lichbach (1994389) captures this notion of individual motivation by articulating what scholars see as several truths of fry upheavals1) Peasants are unconcerned with broad purposes, philosophical systems, political theories, and the likes2) Peasant grievances are specific and salubrious defined, limited and local3) Peasant actions are designed to satisfy material self interest, and therefore4) Peasants will participate in collective action when they stand to gain particularistic benefits.The rebel elite, on the other hand, are willing to risk more, but withal predict to gain more if they are supremacyful even if success entails a comprom ise outcome. That is, their motivation for leading a rebellion will be more in line with altering the material and political resources of a collective people over self interested accumulation. In effect, in pursuit of this broad goal the rebel elite will machinate those for whom the deprivation is personal, and when necessary pay selective benefit to keep rebel soldiers in the fold.Put differently, grievances are not socially constructed by rebel entrepreneurs (Collier, 2000), but instead lie at the core of the motivation to mug up in response to the maldistribution of resources, such as land (Midlarsky, 1988) income (eg. Muller andSeligison, 1987), or political doorway. Initially, such involvement brings with it very little comprise. However, as the state begins to respond to what it perceives as a threat, costs will be incurred at the individual level (Regan and Henderson, 2002 Gartner and Regan, 1996). As the cost of witness or rebellion increase a rational individual will l ook to defect from the movement, unless the rebel leader can find a way to controvert the costs by way of selective benefits. As the reverse movement germinates the requirements of the selective benefits can be rather low, but as the threat to the state increases, so does the level of repression and subsequently the demands by rebel soldiers for selective side payments. That is, there is a distinction between the onset of protest and the onset of senior higher levels of civil conflict. Mobilization may be a necessary condition for civil conflict but non- groundless protest and violent rebellion are distinct. This is evident in the data on Minorities at Risk (Gurr, 2000). Because initial mobilization may carry minimal cost, grievances may well be sufficient to motivate the disaffected to participate in protest activities. In economic terms the cost of rebel comprehend is low because the size of the potential labour pool is large. However, the costs associated with teeming scale conflict or civil war are such that only the provision of selected benefits that outweigh the costs imposed by the state for participation can spur an individual to remain committed to the cause, and bulwark may be the most important side payment (eg. heath et al,2000).Mason (1996 and with Heath et al, 2000) poses the question of when the non-elite will support the rebels or the government. presumably each individual has the option of whether to lend support to one side or both sides, or neither sides, and that choice is predicted on maximize their utility for a tending(p) level of effort. Three factors usually bring the conditions under which non-elite support a rebel movement anticipated benefits, costs, and estimates of the likelihood that support for one group would be detected by the other. In the latter instance the costs are incurred when participation is detected. Using a maximization model analogy to the choice between paying or evading taxes, Mason demonstrates that w hen there are populace benefits from rebel participation (ie, non-excludable), hence rebel support will be largely a amour of the fear of punishment if their support is detected (199670). When fear of detection is high the rebel leadership must resort to paying selective benefits (excludable). However, when the rebels throw a specific region and rebel soldiers can be adequately protected, selective benefits can be reduced in proportion to the marrow of security offered by the rebels. Protection comes primarily in the form of screen participants from the political repression meted out by the state, such that as the state increases repression more people will mobilize around the rebel cause in order to avoid the abuse at the hands of the state.The general arguments present a picture of a group that seeks redress from its out-and-out(a) or relative level of deprivation, most often a result of starchy or informal government policies to channel resources in particular patterns. This distribution of resources or maldistribution increases the inducements for the non-elite to support the elite who are organizing an armed challenge to state authority. But rebel soldiers act rationally and only support a movement when they expect to gain materially from participation. Absent a strong philosophical attraction to the rebel movement the soldiers will be motivated most directly by the provision of both excludable and non-excludable benefits. Both the state and the rebel- elite campaign for the support of the masses by providing a rumple of protective cover, punishment and benefits.My argument suggests that the importance of economic incentives, or at the extreme, greed, depends on two factors the level of repression a state administers toward suspected rebels, and the amount of bulwark the rebel movement can provide the individual. When repression is high the individual will be more concerned with protection, thereby decreasing the importance of economic conc erns. In effect the excludable good provided by the rebel elite is protection against acts of violence perpetrated by the state. However, as coercion by the government decreases, concerns over protection gives way to those of income with the result that the individual participant must be paid for by heart and soul of some other excludable good, which we might think about in terms of income paid for their labour.The escalation from political protest to civil violence, conflict or war is a function of the actions and reactions of the rebels and the state, and I can argue that, it follows an identifiable sequence (Moore, 2000 1998). As grievances lead to opposition against state policies, political entrepreneurs begin to mobilize opposition supporters. The state response is to try to minimize mobilization through efforts at coercion or subsidisation (Bayan, 2002 Regan and Henderson, 2002). As the state gets more coercive the rebel entrepreneurs shake up a greater prospect to provid e protection to potential supporters, possibly in spite of not being able to offer economic incentives parallel to those offered by the state (Heath et al 2000). Initially the opposition may squeeze non-violent means, but as the opposition grows it will press for greater demands or concessions from the state, in part because their ability to do so has increased, but also because their constituency will reflect a wider spectrum. As the state responds with increasing repression the level of violence moves from protest to rebellion, and possibly to civil war (Gurr, 2000).From this framework we declaim a series of testable premises1 The greater the level of inequality the higher will be the probability of observing the onset of protest, rebellion, and conflict in fragile states.Since the ability to provide excludable or non-excludable benefits sufficient to secure the support of the masses will be partially a function of the level of discontent at the status quo position, the get th e level of absolute or relative level of penury political or material the greater the marginal utility of each increment of a public or nonpublic benefit. Therefore potential rebels can be mobilized more easily when the pre-conflict status quo position provides for a rather low level of utility. This would be reflected in the wealth of the country that is distributable (per capita GDP) and the degree to which it is distributed equitably (GINI).2 Higher levels of political repression will decrease the likelihood of the onset of protest, but increase rebellion and civil war. Conflicts in fragile states do not emerge wholly from the wellspring of discontent, but rather move from lower levels of unrest toward large-scale violence and war. Recruitment and mobilization are critical. The ability to recruit and organize rebel soldiers will be a function of the degree of protection that can be provided in return for support, or conversely, the level of random punishment meted out by the g overnment. Initially repression will help to dissuade potential protesters from participation, but people involved in violent forms of rebellion will respond differently to government repression. When the opposition engages in violence high levels of state repression will lead potential rebel supporters to conclude that the probability of punishment is high and approaching certainty. Under these conditions potential supporters will join the movement in pursuit of protection from random punishment by the state.3 However, given the lower cost for participation in protest activity extractable resources will go through no effect on the onset of protest. The ability to pay private selective benefits only to those who participate in the rebel movement is vitally important to a movements viability. In general the government will have greater access to resources with which to pay selective benefits, even though they may choose to attempt to stifle participation through repression. In order for the rebel elite to compete with the state in providing private benefits they must obtain access to resources. Localized and easily extractable resources provide the most efficient means to generate income. Once or if they acquire access to exploitable resources these can be converted into private benefits that increase the incentives for the soldiers to maintain loyalty. The greater the ability to pay these selective benefits the more loyal the rebel soldiers and the more difficult is the task facing the state in trying to offer its own array of private benefits. The abundance of resources is only one factor highlighted by Collier and Hoeffler. The ability of a rebellion to recruit soldiers also plays a key role in making a conflict a feasible undertaking other things equal, we might expect that the proportion of tender men in a societyaged between 15-24 would be a factor influencing the feasibility of rebellion the greater the proportion of young men, the easier it would be to recruit rebels (Collier 1999 3). Colliers later work also emphasised the feasibility or opportunity argument over rebel motivations (or grievances), insofar that insurgent movements can only emerge and be sustained when resources are available to finance them (Aspinall 2007). Critics of Collier have argued that his position goes some way to reinforcing the World Banks authorisation (Collier was employed by the World Bank at the time).As scratching Duffield (2001 132-134) emphasises, usefully the only grievance of any relevance is rapid economic decline in other words, poor economic management.CREED AS A CONFLICT DRIVERSoysa (2001) noted that Creed-related conflicts seem to be more prevalent in highly homogenous religious settings, particularly within largely Islamic and Catholic countries. If there is a clash of civilizations, it is much likely that it is politics rather than civilization. Zartman (2000) sees Creed itself as a engage whereby everyone wants to feel some level of identity, through identifying with strong views and/or look systems. Such needs vary according to the entity and environment, the latter being a social trend of greater significance to the current argument than the former. Individuals have a superior need to know who they are in some circumstances than in others. Three such conditions have a predominantly significant impact on the need for identity rapid or profound change, breakdown of other identities, and discrimination.Zartman(2000) also notes that when deprivation sets in, it results in identity based conflict as collective needs for identity turns deprivation into discrimination. In addition to this insecurity sets in and eventually breeds grievance in the group. In other words, Creed is an extension of Grievance. It can be argued that creed-based rebellions may be circumvented by when governments channel resources wealth in such a way as to guarantee equitable distribution of resources or wealth.THE THEORY OF GREEDGreed in this study is, defined as the predaceous aspiration of rebels to grasp material wealth through illegal means short of subjective perceptions of relative deprivation. The greed motivation behind conflict has been popularised by empirical work on the causes of conflicts and war where a cross-sectional of conflicts in different nations is analyzed together econometrically, and greed is understudied by the accessibility or abundance of capturable natural resource rents. In Collier and Hoeffler (2004) conflicts stem from the greedy behaviour of a rebel group in organising an insurgency against the government. Greed is about opportunities faced by the rebel group. The opportunities can be disaggregated into three components financing, recruitment and geography. The most common sources of rebel finance are the appropriation of natural resources, donations from sympathetic Diasporas residing abroad, contributions from foreign states (hostile to the government) or multinational compan ies interested in the region.Natural resource wealth is the chief among the three in terms of its relative importance. Recruitment is about the opportunity to induct conflict manpower something made easier when there is a high proportion of young unemployed males in population, in a setting of endemic poverty and poor education. Geographical situations favourable to rebel groups are mountainous terrain and other safe havens for insurgents. In short, greed simply means the economic opportunity to fight, and should be distinguished from socio-political grievances. Collier and Hoefflers (2004) empirical findings conclude that the set of variables representing rebel opportunity or greed akin to loot-seeking are the main reasons for civil war. By implication, the alternative hypothesis of grievance (justice-seeking) focusing on ethnic religious divisions, political repression and horizontal inequality is dismissed, although its in severeness is not officially tested for. Natural resour ce rents constitute booty and this fact has been use to emphasise the greed or criminal motivation for conflict in fragile states.Central to the Collier and Hoefflers empirical testing for the greed hypothesis is the role of primary commodities in the economic structure. They measure the dependence on natural resources by the share of primary commodity exports in GDP, and the validity of this metric as well as the statistical robustness of the relationship between resource rents and the risk of conflict has been called into question. Be that as it may, the feature Collier and Hoeffler greed and Fearon and Laitin (2003) messages about greed and state failure make rebellion, conflict or civil war has had an immense influence in the media and the donor policy communitys thinking about conflict.Therefore, any theorising about greed must be based on the economic motivations for violence and criminality. Belligerents in the wars of natural-resource rich countries could be acting in ways close to what Olson (1996) referred to as roving bandits who have no encompassing interest in preserving the state or its people but are simply intent on loot-than to stationary bandits who take control of the state and seek to maximise their own profit by encouraging stability and growth in their new domain.Conflict in Fragile States motivated by the desire to control natural resource rents could also mirror warlord competition, a term that owes its origins to the violent competition between leaders attempting to control economic resources in the context of medieval Europe. Skaperdas (2002)In a nutshell, a proper greed-based theory of conflict must relate to the trade-off between production and predation in making a living, where we may view war as larceny writ large. Violence is one means of appropriating the resources of others. Note, that armed conflict implies the absence seizure of contractual interaction (Edgeworth, 1881), and is in stark contrast to the alternative rule of benefiting from the endowments of others via inactive and voluntary deputise (trade) between economic agents, groups or nations. This implies that we also need to specify the conditions under which violence becomes a viable or more attractive option relative to other alternatives.A assortment of game theoretic models describing the non-cooperative and conflictive interaction between groups exist, where the object is to capture the rivals endowment by force. One such model is payable to Hirshleifer (1995), where each group has a fixed resource endowment, which can be used to either produce goods for consumption or armaments to fight the other group. Groups exist in a state of non-contractual disintegration vis--vis each other this also implies the absence of enforceable property rights. The object of trash is to capture some of the rivals endowment. succeeder in war is uncertain, and the probability of victory is given by a Tullock (1980) contest success function, where t he probability of victory for any group is given by their own war machine expenditure relative to the total fighting outlay made by all protagonists. Additionally, there is a military effectiveness parameter (akin to what is known as a force multiplier in military establishments) something that raises the effectiveness of each unit of fighting effort. In the absence of increasing returns to scale in military effectiveness, and if a minimal subsistence income is present there will be a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium associated with some fighting. In other words, in the equilibrium both (or all) parties will be engaged in some fighting with each other, as well as some successful activities unless one side manages to conquer others due to its individual military superiority. Hirshleifer (1995) describes this as a state of anarchy -something akin to primitive tribal warfare. Note, no possibility of trade is permitted between groups.Skaperdas (1992) outlines a model that is similar because it has a fixed resource endowment which can be devoted to either production or armament. The probability of success in war also depends on a similar contest success function.Both these models, however, neglect the destructiveness of war (collateral damage), and its capacity to ravage productive capacity, additional to direct military expenditure. These models employ intermediate inputs, and not factors of production, which can be shifted between fighting and production at no cost. Secondly, there is no growth in these models, something which would raise the opportunity costs of war. A similar effect could arise from complementarities in production between groups and/or economies of scale, which would make mergers between groups or cooperation in each groups self-interest. Thirdly, the possibilities of peaceful exchange need to be limited (absent in Hirshleifer, 1995) in order to shorten conflict.Wars can also reflect the absence of institutions which facilitate negotiation and peaceful exchange. Despite these limitations, there is much in these models that can explain the greedy behaviour as analyzed by the empirical exponents of the greed hypothesis. The battlefront of readily capturable natural resource based rents may make conflict more attractive when compared to peaceful production, as can a deficit of intermediate inputs due to population pressure. These resources are best regarded as a nonproduced prize such as oil or diamonds (which apart from parentage costs are like manna from heaven), whose ownership is violently contested. Secondly, contributions from a sympathetic diaspora (or aid from a super-power in the cold war era) can raise the probability of victory of a potential rebel group against the state. Also, the inability of the state to act as a Stackelberg leader in a potentially divided nation may raise the chances of war between groups in a manner similar to the weak state capacity mechanism favoured by some political scientists (li ke James Fearon). For example, in the Hirshleifer (1995) model where different groups are in a state of anarchy vis--vis one another, the ability of one group to behave as a Stackelberg leader reduces equilibrium fighting levels and raises each sides per-capita income.The leader, however, gains relatively less compared to followers, creating an incentive for each side to be a follower. If one group is strong and militarily more effective it will dominate other groups, and there will be no fighting in the equilibrium. This may lead to state formation, which may or